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This box is part of the “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy” for 2019 Q3
Trade tensions between the United States and China, 
materialised in several rounds of bilateral tariff increases 
between the two countries in the latest quarters, seem to 
be significantly affecting global economic activity. In 
addition to the impact on bilateral trade flows between 
these two countries, these tensions appear to be affecting 
other countries through the fall in demand derived from 
lower global activity and as a result of the economic 
effects of greater global uncertainty (see Charts  1.1 
and 1.2). The persistence of this situation over time could 
also significantly increase the adverse effects, given the 
integration of the different economies in global trade 
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SOURCES: Index of Ahir, Bloom and Furceri (2018), CPB, World Bank, European Central Bank and Banco de España.
a The index is constructed by analysing how frequently concepts linked to uncertainty and trade appear in analysts' reports.
b Intra-area trade is excluded for the euro area.
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Chart 1
RISING PROTECTIONISM HAS NOTICEABLE CONSEQUENCES ON GLOBAL ACTIVITY
The escalation of tariff-related tensions between the United States and China, both highly significant economies at the global level in terms 
of their share and high degree of interconnectedness, affects the activity of both countries and is transmitted to other countries through many 
real and financial channels.
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through global value chains. This Box aims to summarise 
the developments in the trade conflict between the United 
States and China and to describe the main channels 
through which they seem to be affecting the world 
economy.
Several rounds of increases in tariffs on bilateral trade 
flows between the United States and China have been 
announced and applied since March 2018 (see Tables 1 
and 2). Over the course of 2018, the measures adopted by 
the two countries resulted in the imposition of trade tariffs 
on different types of goods accounting for around 45% of 
US imports from China and 55% of Chinese imports from 
the United States. Following a truce which commenced in 
December 2018, the escalation of bilateral tariff increases 
entered a new phase in May 2019. Since then, new 
decisions were made to increase tariffs, both on goods 
already affected by the measures adopted in 2018 and on 
other additional goods. As a consequence, all US imports 
from China and nearly three quarters of China’s purchases 
from the United States would be subject to tariffs at the 
end of this year, in accordance with the scheduled dates 
for entry into force of the different tariffs. In addition to the 
tariff measures, announcements have been made of 
possible restrictions to the exchange of technology, 
although no specific actions have yet been determined.
Rising protectionism between these two economies, 
which are the largest worldwide and are increasingly 
interconnected with each other and the rest of the world, 
might have a substantial impact on the world economy 
through numerous direct and indirect channels. A direct 
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SOURCES: CEIC and Peterson Institute for International Economics.
a There are overlaps regarding goods subject to tariffs in other rounds and, consequently, only the additional effect on the percentage of imports 
subject to tariffs is shown.
Volume of
imports
($bn)
Cumulative % of imports 
from US subject to tariffs
Change since May 2019,
 projected date of entry into force
Products affected
strap rac ,stcudorp larutlucirgA–2243
tnempiuqe lacidem ,slairetam waR–2361
60 (a) 56 5-10% to 5-25% (1 Jun-19) Agricultural products, chemicals
New: 5-10% (1 Sept-19)
New: 5-10% (15 Dec-19)
75 (a) 71
Agricultural products, chemicals,
industrial machinery
TARIFFS IMPOSED BY CHINA ON THE UNITED STATES
Table 2
SOURCE: US Census Bureau.
Volume of
imports
($bn)
Cumulative % of 
imports from China 
subject to tariffs
Change since May 2019,
 projected date of entry into force
Products affected
34 6 25 to 30% (15 Oct-19) Machinery, capital goods
16 9 25 to 30% (15 Oct-19) Electrical equipment, capital goods
200 46 10 to 30% (15 Oct-19)
Furniture, electronics, cars, leather,
 other intermediate and capital goods
115 78 New: 15% (1 Sept-19) Clothing, footwear, electronic components
160 100 New: 15% (15 Dec-19) Mobile telephones, toys, computers
TARIFFS IMPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES ON CHINA
Table 1
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channel runs through changes in demand and in the 
relative prices of goods. Specifically, an increase in tariffs 
leads to the erosion of consumer disposable income, 
which negatively affects consumption and investment. 
Conversely, it also makes domestic production more 
attractive than imported production. In any event, if trade 
reprisals take place, external demand decreases. In the 
specific case of China and the United States, the effect 
arising from the fall in commodity prices as a result of the 
dominant position of the two countries in oil and industrial 
metals demand worldwide is especially significant. An 
additional direct mechanism is one which operates 
through cross-border financial positions (although the 
limited openness of China’s capital account restricts this 
channel’s potential). Indirect channels are related to rising 
uncertainty, which hampers consumer and business 
confidence, weakening consumption and investment. 
From a financial standpoint, they are related to an increase 
in risk aversion and a decline in asset valuations.
Based on the available data it is difficult to accurately 
estimate the specific impact which the different waves of 
tariff hikes may have had on global economic activity. This 
consideration particularly affects the latest actions 
announced within the escalation which started in May this 
year, since most of them have not yet come into force (they 
will in October and December) or have done so very 
recently (in September). To approximate the possible 
economic impact of these actions on global activity a 
simulation exercise using a macroeconometric model has 
been conducted.1 Specifically, the effect of the tariffs 
announced by the United States and China since May this 
year, regardless of whether they had been applied yet, was 
simulated. These measures affect all US imports from 
China and 71% of the reciprocal flow. Chart 1.4 shows two 
scenarios, reflecting the transmission channels described 
previously. The first scenario relates to the real direct 
channels, i.e. those which run through changes in bilateral 
trade between the two countries and the global effects of 
the second round owing to the decline in global demand. 
The second scenario also adds the possible effects arising 
from the fall in confidence and the increase in uncertainty. 
This channel is approximated through an ad hoc investment 
risk premium increase of 25  bp in the US and China 
combined with a 10 bp rise in the rest of  economies, a 
smaller shock than that seen in August this year.2, 3
According to the simulations, the increase in tariffs 
(scenario 1) would entail a significant contraction  in activity 
in the United States, China and also in the euro area, taking 
global GDP 0.25% below the baseline scenario in 
cumulative terms in 2019-2021, with declines in the GDP 
of the United States and China of 0.26% and 0.38%, 
respectively. The greater impact on the Chinese economy 
reflects the fact that the volume of imports subject to US 
tariffs as a share of China’s GDP is higher than the volume 
on which the Chinese authorities imposed tariffs in 
retaliation. GDP of the euro area is estimated to contract 
by 0.2%, reflecting its high degree of trade openness, 
which makes it more vulnerable to the fall in global activity 
(see Chart  1.3). The second scenario shows how the 
confidence effect could ultimately generate significant 
adverse impacts in relation to those arising from the real 
channels. This is not only due to the direct impact from 
higher investment risk premia  but also due to the second-
round effect on global activity, which has a considerable 
repercussion on the euro area. However, it is difficult to 
calibrate the effect of the trade war on uncertainty and, 
consequently, its impacts should be regarded with more 
caution than those of the real channels.4
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1	 	Specifically,	the	NiGEM	model	of	the	British National Institute of Economic and Social Research. The documentation for the model 
is available at https://nimodel.niesr.ac.uk/.
2	 	The	magnitude	of	the	investment	risk	premia	shock	is	somewhat	lower	than	that	seen	in	reaction	to	those	recorded	in	the	corporate	
spreads	in	August	2019,	at	the	height	of	the	trade	tensions.
3	 	A	number	of	assumptions	are	used	in	the	simulation.	Specifically,	it	is	considered	that	expectations	are	rational,	monetary	policy	is	
exogenous	 and	 fiscal	 policy	 acts	 as	 an	 automatic	 stabiliser	 (simultaneously	maintaining	 a	medium-term	budgetary	 target).	 The	
monetary policy assumption is introduced to prevent the increase in imported goods prices from triggering an increase in interest 
rates	in	the	United	States,	as	this	would	be	contrary	to	the	Federal	Reserve’s	reaction.
4	 	The	simulations	show	effects	of	the	same	order	of	magnitude	as	other	studies,	although	they	are	not	directly	comparable	due	to	the	
different	nature	of	the	shocks	included.	In	the	World	Economic	Outlook	of	October	2018,	the	IMF	shows	impacts	on	the	pure	trade	
scenario	of	-0.3%	in	the	United	States	and	-0.6%	in	China	in	2021.	Also,	in	the	OECD’s	exercise	included	in	the	Economic Outlook 
of	April	2019,	the	impact	of	an	adverse	scenario	in	which	confidence	deteriorates	sharply	is	-0.8%	for	the	United	States	and	-1.2%	
for China in 2021.
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Nevertheless, there are several factors which could 
produce different effects to those considered in these 
simulations. First, the exercise undertaken does not take 
into account the expansionary reaction of monetary 
policies globally, which has already begun and would tend 
to reduce the magnitude of the impact. Second, trade 
tensions may lead to changes in the location of global 
production chains, in which China has a dominant 
position, affecting activity in third countries, positively or 
negatively, according to the case at hand, depending on 
its complementarity or substitutability with respect to 
China’s production. Another factor not considered in the 
simulations, given the limitations of the model used, is 
trade potentially being diverted to third economies, such 
as the euro area, which could benefit in terms of their 
exports of certain types of products and services.
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